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Abstract—We consider the problem of energy management
in microgrid networks. A microgrid is capable of generating
a limited amount of energy from a renewable resource and is
responsible for handling the demands of its dedicated customers.
Owing to the variable nature of renewable generation and the
demands of the customers, it becomes imperative that each mi-
crogrid optimally manages its energy. This involves intelligently
scheduling the demands at the customer side, selling (when there
is a surplus) and buying (when there is a deficit) the power
from its neighboring microgrids depending on its current and
future needs. Typically, the transaction of power among the
microgrids happens at a pre-decided price by the central grid.
In this work, we formulate the problems of demand and battery
scheduling, energy trading and dynamic pricing (where we allow
the microgrids to decide the price of the transaction depending
on their current configuration of demand and renewable energy)
in the framework of stochastic games. Subsequently, we propose
a novel approach that makes use of independent learners Deep
Q-learning algorithm to solve this problem. Through extensive
empirical evaluation, we show that our proposed framework is
more beneficial to the majority of the microgrids and we provide
a detailed analysis of the results.
I. INTRODUCTION
Microgrid networks are a collection of small-scale renew-
able energy resources that fulfil local consumer demands. They
may function independently or in collaboration with other
microgrids by trading energy. The main advantage of using
microgrids is their ability to decentralize power distribution
from the central grid, thus providing a more efficient archi-
tecture for energy distribution by targeting smaller areas and
serving as reliable power sources when the central grid has
a deficiency. In addition, they also reduce losses incurred
due to long-distance energy transmissions and prove to be a
more cost-effective and eco-friendly alternative to traditional
resources such as fossil fuels that cause more pollution and are
depleting at an alarming rate. Their main tasks include local
power generation, storing energy, trading power with other
microgrids and satiating local consumer demands.
At the demand side, customers have certain flexible de-
mands that can be satisfied any time during certain given
time periods throughout the day. These loads are structured
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in such a way that they can be fulfilled anytime during their
allotted time period. For example: If a washing machine is
being operated any time between 2 pm to 6 pm at a particular
household, the microgrid would have the ability to intelligently
provide the energy required to run the washing machine at
any time during this period. These demands are classified as
Activities of Daily Living (ADL). Each microgrid has the
ability to schedule these ADL demands depending on the
peak demand as well as the local energy generation. ADL
scheduling does not reduce power consumption; it merely
helps in reducing the peak load at any time instance.
Energy trading plays a vital role in the decentralization of
power generation and maintaining stability at the microgrid
sites. This involves buying and selling the power among neigh-
boring microgrids at favorable prices. The main focus of our
paper is to highlight advantages of using the dynamic pricing
scheme (a scheme that allows the microgrids to select the
prices at which it decides to sell power) in tandem with ADL
scheduling. The dynamic pricing scheme not only provides
the microgrids autonomy for selecting prices according to their
convenience (based on their current state), but also encourages
energy trading amongst them. This promotes more cooperation
amongst microgrids thereby causing a lower dependency on
the central grid for fulfilling local energy requirements. This in
turn enables better decentralization, and also helps individual
microgrids obtain higher rewards as our results show, than if
they were to follow a constant pricing policy. ADL scheduling
not only helps reduce the peak load, it also allows the
microgrid to intelligently defer certain loads while selling the
remaining energy in order to optimize the overall reward it
receives.
The literature on the energy trading between microgrid
networks is vast. The problem of energy trading in microgrid
networks has been primarily considered from three different
points of view. In [1]–[3], game theoretic models have been
proposed along with the equilibrium analysis of solutions. In
[4]–[8], the energy trading has been formulated as an opti-
mization problem and models such as convex programming
and Linear programming have been used to compute optimal
solutions. The third popular framework for energy trading in
microgrids is Reinforcement Learning (RL). RL is a popular
paradigm that provides learning algorithms for computing
the solution when the model information is not known. We
now discuss some of the works that propose RL algorithms
to solve the energy trading problem among microgrids. In
[9], an energy trading game using RL techniques has been
proposed. In their model, each microgrid, based on its current
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state configurations, computes the amount of energy to be
traded with neighboring microgrids in order to maximize its
rewards. However, the prices in this model are the market
prices and are not dynamic. In [10], [11], a dynamic pricing
problem for a single microgrid is considered. Based on the
consumption pattern of its customers, the microgrid decides
the price of the power to be sold to its customers. In [12],
a novel energy trading model for microgrid networks is pro-
posed that considers dynamic pricing. However, the dynamic
scheduling of customers demand is not considered. Deep
Reinforcement Learning algorithms have been successfully
applied for computing optimal solutions in the context of
energy trading between microgrids in [13], [14], for storage
device management in [15], and for energy management in
[16], [17]. The closest work to ours is [18], where an energy
trading model for a microgrid network has been proposed that
also considers job scheduling for customers. We extend this
model considerably to include dynamic pricing for transactions
between microgrids and apply the independent learners Deep
Q-learning algorithm that is shown to have a good empirical
performance in literature [19].
In [20], an extensive survey of RL algorithms for demand
response is carried out. They also identify the need for
RL algorithms to consider demand response in multi-agent
scenarios with demand-dependent dynamic prices. Our work
is a step in this direction.
Our main contributions in this paper are as follows:
1) We construct a Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning
framework that addresses the supply-side management
problems of dynamic pricing, battery scheduling as well
as the demand-side management problem of scheduling
ADL jobs.
2) To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first work that
uses a novel DQN approach to solve both these problems
by creating two separate neural networks (for handling
the tasks of stochastic job scheduling as well as energy
trading) both working as ingredients to the same Markov
Decision Process.
3) We perform experiments to show that the reward obtained
by a microgrid is lower if it employs a constant pricing
policy instead of a dynamic pricing policy as the latter
ensures better participation in energy trading.
4) We empirically show that the proposed dynamic pricing
setup ensures more reward for most of the participating
microgrids.
5) Based on the results of our experiments we also provide
detailed analysis on the behaviour of microgrids under
various setups.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we describe the model of the microgrids that
enables the energy trading and job scheduling. Our solution
is based on a framework of the problem that consists of inde-
pendent microgrids, interconnected by multiple transmission
lines, in the presence of a central grid. Each microgrid has
the ability to locally generate renewable energy and it also
has the provision of storing energy in a battery unit. We
divide each day into several time steps of equal duration,
for better granularity of the decision-making process. At each
time step, the microgrids have information about their current
local demand, the renewable energy generated, the amount of
energy stored in the battery as well as the remaining ADL
demands that are to be fulfilled in that day. Depending on
this information the microgrids make decisions regarding their
demand and supply management at regular time intervals.
These decisions are as follows:
• The scheduling and fulfillment of ADL demands.
• The fulfillment of non-ADL demands.
• The amount of electricity to buy or sell, and also the price
at which to sell electricity.
• The amount of energy to be stored in the battery.
We formulate this problem in the framework of stochastic
games. A stochastic game is a popular framework that is used
for modeling competing or cooperative agents in a stochastic
environment [21]. The main ingredient of a stochastic game
is the tuple < n, S,A, P, r1, r2, . . . , rn, γ >, where n is the
number of agents, S = S1×S2×. . .×Sn denotes the joint state
space where Si is the state space of agent i, A = A1 ×A2 ×
. . .× An denotes the joint action space with Ai representing
the action space of the agent i. P (s′|s, a) is the probability
transition rule that gives the probability of moving to next
state s′ ∈ S when action tuple a ∈ A is taken in state s ∈ S.
Note that in our model, an agent i can only observe its own
state si ∈ Si and picks an action ai ∈ Ai. Finally, ri(s, a)
is the single-stage reward function of the agent i that gives
the reward value obtained when the joint action tuple a ∈ A
is taken in state s ∈ S and γ is the discount factor. The
objective of the agent i is to compute a policy a pi∗i : Si −→ Ai,
that maximizes its total discounted reward, given the optimal
policies of other agents pi∗−i. That is,
pi∗i = arg max
pii∈Πi
E
[ ∞∑
i=0
γiri(si, (pii(si), pi
∗
−i(si))
]
, (1)
where Πi is set of all policies of agent i and E(.) is the
expectation over states si, i = 0, . . . ,∞ with the initial state
s0 sampled from a known distribution ρ.
We now describe in detail the states, actions and single-stage
rewards of each of the microgrids.
A. States
The state of the microgrid i at time t is given by: S =
(t, neit, d
i
t, ADL
i
t, GP
i
t ), where:
1) Time state (t): This is the time interval of the day at
which the decision is taken by the microgrid.
2) The Net Energy (neit): This is a cumulative sum of
battery value (bit) and generated renewable energy (re
i
t)
subtracted by the Non-ADL demand (dit). Thus ne
i
t =
reit + b
i
t − dit
3) Non-ADL Demand (dit) : This signifies the local con-
sumer demand pertaining to that microgrid. This is pro-
vided in addition to the net demand so that the agent is
able to estimate the cumulative sum of the battery and
the renewable generation at that time step.
4) ADL state (ADLit): This state component jointly signifies
the ADL loads that are remaining and the adl loads that
have been completed by the adl agent, till the current
time step.
5) Grid Price (GP it ): This is the price at which a microgrid
buys power from the central grid at that time step. 1
B. Actions
As discussed above, the actions of the agents involve
deciding the ADL demands to be scheduled and the amount
of energy to be sold/bought. Additionally, we integrate the
pricing model where the microgrids also decide the price at
which energy trading takes place. In particular, the actions of
the microgrid are as follows:
• ADL action (adlit): This signifies the ADL demands that
a microgrid plans to fulfil in the current time step.
• Electricity to be traded (uit): This denotes the amount of
power that the microgrid decides to trade amongst other
microgrids as well as the central grid. It is governed by
a set of constraints that are derived from the net demand,
the Non-ADL demand, the ADL action and the battery
capacity to ensure that the microgrid remains stable. A
negative value of uit signifies that the microgrid is buying
electricity whereas a positive value of uit signifies that the
microgrid is selling electricity.
• Price Chosen (pit): This signifies the price chosen by
the microgrid at which power is sold. Sellers quote a
price while buyers are assumed to adhere to the price
determined by the sellers.
After the microgrids select their respective pit and u
i
t actions,
they are divided into two groups namely buyer microgrids and
seller microgrids. A grid is classified as a buyer microgrid
based on whether or not the value of uit selected is negative.
Conversely, a grid is classified as a seller microgrid if the value
of uit selected is positive.
Once the microgrids are divided into groups of buyers
and sellers, energy trading happens in the following way.
First, a microgrid from the seller group (let’s call it the
leader), that quotes the lowest price is selected. The amount
of energy that the leader microgrid is willing to sell is shared
amongst the buyer microgrids, proportional to the energy they
demand. This is to ensure that there is no bias amongst
buyer microgrids. Once the leader microgrid has sold all of
its energy, a new leader is chosen, i.e., the one quoting the
next best price. This chain continues on till there are no seller
microgrids or no buyer microgrids left in the process.
Even after these transactions, if certain demands of the
buyer microgrids remain unfulfilled, the remaining amount
of energy is bought from the central grid at a price: GP it .
Conversely if all the demands of the buyer microgrids are
satiated, the seller microgrids end up selling the remaining uit
to the central grid, at a price: GP it - k.
1Please note that when the microgrids sell power to the central grid, the
selling price would be GP it - k, where ’k’ is a positive integer. The reason
for this will be made clear in the ‘Design Constraints’ section.
C. Reward Function
The goal of each microgrid is to obtain adequate profits
acquired by selling electricity, while satiating local consumer
demand which consists of both ADL as well as Non-ADL
demand. The reward computed 2, takes care of both of these
conditions by giving a positive reinforcement to the agents
when electricity is sold, charges the microgrid if electricity
is bought, and also penalises when the instantaneous local
consumer demand (Non-ADL demand) as well as the ADL
demand is not met with.
rit = u
i
t ∗ pit − k1 ∗ (unfulfilled Non-ADL demand)
−k1 ∗ (unfulfilled ADL demand),
where k1 is a positive constant. Changing the values of k1
leads to the the microgrids exhibiting different behaviors.
When uit is much larger than k1, the microgrids favour selling
energy as compared to satisfying their local consumer de-
mands (both Non-ADL as well as ADL demand). Conversely,
when k1 is much larger than uit, the microgrids prefer to
satiate their local consumer demands (both Non-ADL as well
as ADL) as compared to selling energy. This can be explained
as follows: each microgrid is tasked with optimising its reward
function. By changing k1, the weights given to selling energy
and satisfying local consumer demand changes, which in
turn changes the reward function. To emulate a real world
scenario, we have given a higher importance to satisfying
local consumer demand as compared to selling energy. In our
experiments, k1 is set to 30.
If uit is positive, it implies that the microgrid is selling
electricity and hence receives a profit. If uit is negative, it
implies that the microgrid is buying energy and hence it incurs
a cost. As k1 is a positive constant, the microgrid is penalised
for not satisfying the Non-ADL as well as the ADL demand.
If the local consumer demands are met with, the microgrid
receives no penalty.
Note that the reward of each microgrid depends not only
on its own action, but also on the action of other microgrids
(as the energy being traded by other microgrids as well as the
price they quote implicitly affects the reward of that microgrid)
and hence, this structure induces a stochastic game amongst
the microgrids.
III. PROPOSED ALGORITHM
To fulfill the demand-side management tasks as well as
supply-side tasks, each microgrid employs two agents. The
first agent (also called the ADL agent) is responsible for the
demand-side management. It decides which ADL tasks would
be scheduled in the current time step, and this information
is then provided to the second agent. The second agent (also
called the Energy Trading (ET) agent) is responsible for the
supply-side management. It decides the units of electricity to
buy or sell, and also sets the transaction prices, i.e., the prices
at which the energy trading happens.
Based on the actions taken by the ADL and ET agents, a
common reward is obtained by both the agents. This can be
2Please note that the reward function does not take into account the profits
obtained by selling electricity to the local customers.
Figure 1: Interplay of states and actions between ADL agent and ET agent
justified by the reasoning that both the agents are cohesively
working in order to fulfill a common higher goal. Hence, the
same credit will be assigned to both of these agents. Due to
the interplay between the ADL and ET agents, a single MDP
is created which models the state transitions, action selection
as well as the reward computation for both the agents. This
interplay is shown in Figure 1.
The advantages of using the two separate networks that
share the same rewards are as follows: (a). By creating two
networks that perform two different tasks that help fulfill
a common goal, we have devised a method to successfully
model the execution of sequential tasks, using RL. Moreover,
by propagating the same reward to both the networks, we
have also empirically shown that sharing the same reward for
modeling sequential tasks does lead to network learning. Such
kind of a sequential learning approach can be used for a lot of
real-world fields such as robotics, auctions etc (b). By creating
two networks, instead of one very large network, we reduce
the number of iterations needed to obtain optimal policy as
this enables better exploration of the action space (c). The
interplay between the networks as shown in the paper is also
novel to the best of our knowledge.
Note that both, the ADL Agent and the ET agent have the
same state space except for one parameter. The ADL agent has
a parameter known as the ADL state (which signifies which
ADL actions have to be fulfilled). Instead of this parameter,
the ET agent has a parameter known as ADL action ( the
action chosen by the ADL agent). Hence the replay buffers
for both the agents are similar. Therefore, by sharing a similar
state space and reward, the agents are cooperating. Moreover
since the ADL and ET agents have to optimize (increase) their
rewards, they would implicitly cooperate to obtain an optimal
policy.
To optimise the long term discounted rewards obtained by
each microgrid, each agent uses the Deep Q-learning algorithm
[22]. This is further described in detail in Algorithm 1.
IV. DESIGN CONSTRAINTS
In this section, we describe the constraints that we impose
on the proposed model.
Algorithm 1: Proposed Algorithm
1 Initialize the ADL network with random weights λ.
2 Initialize the ET network with random weights θ.
3 Initialize the replay memory (M ) to capacity D.
4 for episode 1 to N do
5 Take an ADL action (adlit) using an −greedy policy
via the ADL Network (Qadl).
6 Using the chosen adlit, select actions p
i
t, u
i
t using an
−greedy policy via the ET Network (Qet).
7 Observe the rewards (rit) and next states (s
′
adl, s
′
et)
obtained by executing the actions.
8 Store tuple (sadl, set, adl, pit, u
i
t, r
i
t, s
′
adl, s
′
et) in M .
9 Sample a mini batch of
(sadl, set, adl
i
t, p
i
t, u
i
t, r
i
t, s
′
adl, s
′
et) from M and set :
φ = rit + γ ∗maxa(Qadl(s
′
adl, a|λ))
ψ = rit + γ ∗maxp,u(Qet(s
′
et, p, u|θ))
10 Perform the gradient descent step for the ADL
network on the loss function given by:
(φ−Qadl(sadl, adlit|λ))2
11 Perform the gradient descent step for the ET network
on the loss function given by:
(ψ −Qet(set, pit, uit|θ))2
12 end
A. Price Constraints
To ensure that transactions occur between microgrids, the
microgrids are allowed to sell energy within a price range
of [gp − k, gp] (where gp is the central grid price and k
is a positive constant). This can be justified as follows. If
a microgrid quotes a price higher than that quoted by the
central grid, the transactions would not even occur as the other
microgrids would prefer to buy directly from the central grid.
Moreover, to ensure that energy trading occurs between
microgrids, they are allowed to sell power to the central grid
at the least price the microgrid can quote, i.e., gp − k. This
would ensure that a microgrid would prefer to sell to another
microgrid as compared to the central grid. Next, we describe
the constraints, that are required to maintain stability at the
microgrids.
B. Energy Trading Constraints
For emulating a real world scenario, it becomes imperative
that real world constraints are imposed on the amount of
energy bought or sold. These constraints are dependant on
physical limitations such as the maximum battery capacity,
the max energy that can be handled by each microgrid etc.
The constraints are imposed as follows:
a. Lower bound on the amount of electricity traded:
uit ≥ max(−M, neit − F (Ait)−B). (2)
The first term −M depicts that a microgrid cannot be
allowed to buy more than M amount of electricity, thus
preventing the microgrid circuits from being excessively over-
loaded due to the inflow of excess energy. Thus −M ≤ uit.
After each transaction, the amount of energy that would be
stored in the battery of each microgrid, (after factoring in the
energy generated, the Non-ADL demand, the ADL demand,
the ADL action selected and the energy present in the battery
prior to the transaction) would be less than or equal to the the
maximum battery capacity, hence preventing the microgrids
from buying excess energy and then in turn, wasting it. Thus,
neit − F (Ait)− uit ≤ B, which implies (3)
neit − F (Ait)−B ≤ uit, (4)
where F (Ait) represents the units of energy that are required
to fulfill the selected ADL action.
The second term in the max function in (2) ensures that the
ADL action selected by the ADL Network is fulfilled.
A maximum of the above two terms is taken to allow
the microgrid to trade the maximum energy possible whilst
fulfilling the decided ADL actions and also taking the
microgrid stability into consideration as well.
b. Upper bound on the amount of electricity traded:
uit ≤ neit + dit − F (Ait). (5)
The upper bound is derived from the fact that once an
ADL action has been chosen then it has to be satisfied by
the microgrid. Thus, the amount of energy that the microgrid
should possess after trading energy should be greater than or
equal to F (Ait).
Thus,
neit + d
i
t − uit ≥ F (Ait), which implies (6)
neit + d
i
t − F (Ait) ≥ uit. (7)
After the transactions are completed, the excess energy that
remains is stored in the battery for future use. The battery state
(bit) is updated as follows:
bit+1 = max(0, ne
i
t − uit − F (Ait)). (8)
V. SIMULATION SETUP
In this section, we describe the simulation setups for our
experiments and appropriate models used for comparison pur-
poses. The microgrids used in the experiments either use wind
or solar renewable energies as their source. In order to simulate
the renewable energy generation for all our experiments, we
use the RAPsim software [23].
For comparison purposes, we also implement the constant
pricing model described below:
• Constant Price Model: The microgrids considered in
this case sell energy at the constant grid price decided by
the central grid. However, as highlighted in the transac-
tion constraints, the energy is sold to the central grid at
a price of gp−k. Please note that this model is currently
being utilised in some of the power markets where the
price of the transaction is decided entirely by the central
grid.
We implement our proposed dynamic pricing model and
constant pricing model on following three setups:
1) Setup 1: We first consider a simple three-microgrid
setup where two of them operate on solar while the
third microgrid operates on the wind renewable source.
Moreover, two microgrids adopt the proposed dynamic
pricing scheme while the third microgrid employs con-
stant pricing scheme. The objective of this setup is to
understand the dynamics of energy transactions between
the three agents and to demonstrate the advantage of
dynamic pricing over constant pricing.
2) Setup 2: Next we consider a more practical setup with
8 microgrids - four generate energy via solar farms and
four generate energy via wind farms. In this setup, all
microgrids generate less power than their demand at most
times. We have run this setup under both models - the
proposed dynamic pricing model and the constant pricing
model.
3) Setup 3: This setup is similar to setup 2 with the
main difference being the fact that the total renewable
energy generated by the microgrids is generally more than
the total renewable energy generated by the microgrids
in setup 2 while keeping demands the same. This is
to ensure that microgrids have more energy to sell as
compared to setup 2. We consider eight microgrids, two
of them operating on solar and six of them on wind
renewable source. Such a configuration is considered to
simulate the case were the majority of the microgrids
generate higher electricity than the microgrids of setup 2
without violating the stability constraints.
As mentioned above, we use RAPsim simulator to generate
the necessary per hour renewable energy data for all the
microgrids. We then fit a Poisson distribution on this data and
sample renewable energy units from this distribution during
our experiments. We limit the maximum amount of electricity
that can be generated from renewable sources to 10 units and
consider four decision time intervals in each day. At each
epoch, the non-ADL demand can be one of the four units:
3, 4, 5 or 6. We consider three ADL jobs at the start of
the day4. The maximum amount of energy that can be stored
in the battery is limited to 10 units. Similarly, the maximum
4Please note that we have also carried out experiments under the stochastic
ADL setting where ADL demands appear in stochastic fashion. Please
refer to the https://github.com/marl-smart-grids/energy-trading/blob/master/
Supplementary.pdf for additional results.
Figure 2: ADL job scheduling by the Dynamic Pricing Model under Setup 1
Figure 3: Pricing comparision between the Dynamic Pricing Model and the Constant Pricing Model under Setup 1
Figure 4: Comparison of all the three models with respect to
average rewards under Setup 1
amount of energy that can be bought from other microgrids
or the central grid in a single time period is also limited to
10 units. We consider a constant central grid price of gp = 20
(price unit per electricity unit) for our experiments. Recall
that, in order to ensure cooperation among microgrids, the
selling price to the central grid is fixed at gp − k. In our
experiments, we set the value of k to be 5. Therefore, the
action space for the dynamic pricing strategy is [15, 20] price
units. Both the ADL and ET agents of the microgrid use a
feed forward neural network model with three layers. The
complete configuration of all the microgrids along with the
detailed description of the neural network and the code for all
our experiments is available at the anonymous GitHub link:
https://github.com/marl-smart-grids/energy-trading.
VI. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we discuss the results of our experiments.
We present and discuss them under three setups as defined
above.
Setup 1: From the results of the experiments 1, we make
the following conclusions:
1) All the 3 microgrids converge to a policy that gives higher
rewards than random exploration.
2) We can see from Figure 4 that the agent which follows
dynamic pricing (let us call it dynamic grid) obtains a
higher profit than the microgrid which sells at a constant
price (constant grid) when there is sufficient power gen-
eration. This may be counter-intuitive at first sight for the
reason that, the selling price of the energy by the dynamic
grid is always lower than the price of the constant grid
(which is fixed at all times). However, the third microgrid,
during the process of buying power, when presented with
two options prefers to buy from the microgrid that quotes
a lower price, i.e., from the dynamic grid. In this way
the dynamic grid successfully sells its power to the third
microgrid at most times. The constant grid is left with
no choice but to sell to the central grid at a much lower
selling price (GP − k), yielding lower profits to it.
3) We can observe from Figure 2 that the agents learn
to schedule the ADL demands at different times which
shows that our model is capable of shifting power
consumption from the peak demand time. We can also
observe that the ADL agent picks a certain ADL action
frequently for different time steps which show the conver-
gence of the ADL agent’s policy. In the figure, frequency
denotes the number of times an ADL demand is fulfilled
for the last 10,000 iterations (after convergence), at that
particular time step.
4) We can see from Figure 3, the dynamic nature of the
prices decided by the microgrid at different times. These
prices are dependent on the current state of the microgrid
and are decided at each time period. In the figure, fre-
1Please note that due to space constraints we could not include all the
results of the experiments. However, the same is available at https://github.
com/marl-smart-grids/energy-trading/blob/master/Supplementary.pdf
Microgrid
Rewards Obtained By Following:
Difference in Rewards Winning Policy
Dynamic Pricing Policy (DPP) Constant Pricing Policy (CPP)
1 -13.094589 -13.099846 0.005257 DPP
2 -16.335466 -16.901891 0.566425 DPP
3 -37.476378 -37.532283 0.055905 DPP
4 -54.792268 -54.914326 0.122058 DPP
5 -47.218179 -47.913392 0.695213 DPP
6 -38.744498 -39.517351 0.772853 DPP
7 -55.353694 -54.785216 -0.568478 CPP
8 -64.276123 -63.844191 -0.431932 CPP
Table I: Average rewards obtained by the Dynamic and Constant pricing models under setup 2
Microgrid
Rewards Obtained By Following:
Difference in Rewards Winning Policy
Dynamic Pricing Policy (DPP) Constant Pricing Policy (CPP)
1 -8.83435 -10.03937 1.20502 DPP
2 -1.47279 -1.03270 -0.44006 CPP
3 9.11136 9.75535 -0.64399 CPP
4 14.65479 14.26748 0.38731 DPP
5 -37.28861 -37.72918 0.44057 DPP
6 -47.02739 -47.52489 0.49750 DPP
7 -39.48666 -42.19527 2.70861 DPP
8 -16.90946 -17.86470 0.95524 DPP
Table II: Average rewards obtained by the Dynamic and Constant pricing models under setup 3
quency denotes the number of times a particular price is
selected, for the last 10,000 iterations (after convergence).
From this figure, we can observe that the dynamic grid
has learned to quote a price of 19 for the majority of
times. This would imply that the dynamic grid has learned
to adapt to the constant grid and quote a price lower
than the one quoted by the constant grid which is 20.
Therefore, the dynamic grid successfully sells its power
to the third microgrid leading to more profits.
Setup 2: From the results of our experiments, we draw the
following observations:
1) In Table I, we report the average rewards obtained by the
dynamic pricing and constant pricing policies over the
last 50, 000 iterations (after convergence).
2) From Table I, we observe that the proposed dynamic
pricing model performs better the constant pricing model
for the majority (six out of eight) of microgrids.
3) This empirically shows that following a DPP as compared
to a CPP proves to be more advantageous to a majority
of the microgrids, when energy trading occurs between
microgrids.
Setup 3: Through the results of our experiments, we draw
the following observations:
1) From Table II, we observe that most of the microgrids
receive higher rewards through dynamic pricing than
they would have accumulated through constant pricing.
Therefore, our proposed dynamic pricing model proves
to be more advantageous than the constant pricing model
for the majority of the microgrids.
It can be observed that the microgrids achieve better
rewards in setup 3 than in setup 2 (difference in rewards
are higher in setup 3 compared to setup 2). We attribute
this to the fact that the majority of the microgrids have
higher energy generation in setup 3 as compared to setup
2, which enables them to sell more energy. Moreover,
the effect of dynamic pricing becomes more prominent
when they start generating more power, as noticed in the
difference between their dynamic pricing rewards and
constant pricing reward The differences (column 4 of
Tables 1 and 2) are observed to be more in favour of
dynamic pricing in setup 3 as our proposed model enables
each microgrid to quote prices judiciously throughout the
day, enabling them to sell intelligently and the more the
energy they possess, the more does this intelligent selling
reflect positively in their overall reward.
Remark 1: The objective of our experiments is to under-
stand the behavior of the microgrids learning their strategies
together in a network. We wanted our models to be as close to
real scenarios as possible where all the microgrids learn their
policies parallelly.
Remark 2: It is to be noted that in setup 1, we had two
microgrids that generally generated more renewable energy
than their demands. This was done to understand the dy-
namics of energy transactions between the agents. Since all
the demands were satisfied and the microgrids were able to
sell energy, the rewards were positive. In setup 2 and 3 we
implemented more realistic scenarios (where most microgrids
generally generated less energy than their demand) where
experiments were performed to compare the performance of
microgrid networks following dynamic pricing and constant
pricing policies. Under these setups, the microgrids may have
to buy energy from other grids or the main grid to fulfill some
of their demands which in turn ends up creating a negative
reward.
From these three setups, it is clear that the agents which
follow our dynamic pricing strategy are generally performing
better than the constant pricing model. Moreover, we have also
shown that besides dynamic pricing the microgrids also learn
to intelligently schedule the ADL demands in a way that shifts
the energy consumption away from peak demand.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have constructed a stochastic game frame-
work involving a network of microgrids that enables the energy
trading, dynamic pricing and job scheduling. In order to solve
this problem, We have devised a novel two network model (ET
and ADL networks) that performs both dynamic pricing and
demand scheduling at the same time. To compute the optimal
policies under various setups, we have applied our proposed
algorithm and have shown that the rewards obtained by our
proposed dynamic pricing models yield greater rewards to the
majority of the microgrids. We believe that such a modelling
scheme can be applied to other sequential learning tasks.
As a future work, we would like to introduce an auction
mechanism to enable transactions between microgrids where
buyer microgrids can negotiate the prices decided by the seller
microgrids.
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